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SECRET EYES ONLY

5 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 5 February 1968

DD/I reported that the first KH-4 bucket has been retrieved and that North Korean and North Vietnamese coverage is being assessed as rapidly as possible, although first indications are that coverage was limited and unproductive.

Godfrey drew attention to [redacted] possible North Vietnamese efforts to establish a fighter inceptor capability in the DMZ. 25X

Godfrey drew attention to the excellent quality and quantity of reporting from the Saigon Station, and Carver noted similar laudatory comments on same from outside the Agency.

[redacted] 25X

Carver observed that hostile activity in Khe Sanh last night was probably a probe and not the commencement of major action. He underscored the magnitude of the Communist effort over the past week by noting that there were one hundred coordinated attacks of some consequence against various towns and cities.

[redacted] 25X

Warner reminded that the briefing of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee is on for tomorrow and Wednesday.

DDCI speculated that the primary purpose behind the Communist creation of the "Alliance of National and Peace Forces" could be to provide an ostensibly non-Communist structure to engage in "negotiations" with the NLF to achieve a "coalition" government of South Vietnam.

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The Director advised the DD/S&T that an OXCART flight may be permitted over North Korea sometime during the next two or three days.

The Director solicited all present for new ideas and options for solving the Pueblo problem in the event that the current diplomatic track proves to be unproductive.

Carver noted that George Allen's expertise and experience enabled him to be responsive to a MACV request for a historical analysis of Dien Bien Phu. DD/P noted the existence of several specific similarities between the Communist build-up against Khe Sanh and that against Dien Bien Phu.

Bross drew attention to [redacted] meeting with the George Ball committee. [redacted] provided a report on the military and political situation existing in Korea before and at the time of the Pueblo incident, and the committee concentrated its questions on the U. S. Government's responses in the period immediately following the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo.

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X1

ACTIONS:

1. The Director asked Godfrey to ensure that he is provided with up-to-date briefs (as of 0900 tomorrow) on Khe Sanh action and Pueblo developments for tomorrow morning's briefing of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.

The Director asked DD/I and Godfrey to provide him with a background paper on what was reported and what was forecast in connection with but prior to the Tet offensive.

[redacted]

25X

L. K. White

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